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Local Communities and Globalization in Caritas in Veritate 
 
Jeffery Nicholas 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Caritas in Veritate leaves us with a question, Does Benedict XVI see politics as a 
practice or as an institution?  How one answers this question has tremendous implications for 
how one should address the inequalities of contemporary society and the increasing 
globalization of the world.  Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, would consider politics to be 
primarily a practice with a good internal to its activities.  This good consists in rational 
deliberation with others about the common good.  If one considers politics an institution, 
however, as seems to be the case with Jacques Maritain, then one pays less attention to the 
common good and more attention to the mechanics of the political institution.  The difference 
in understanding goes a long way toward how one conceives of, determines, and achieves the 
common good, a central task for Catholic social teaching.  It also prefigures whether and how 
one can justify self-sacrifice for the common good, demanded of police officers and soldiers, 
for instance, as well as whether and how one prioritizes the practices of a given political 
community.  Caritas in Veritate (CIV) brings to the forefront issues of self-sacrifice and 
prioritization of practices at the global level.  This paper shall address the position Benedict 
XVI lays out on globalization with reference to a global politics through the lens of the 
common good and the distinction between practice and institution. 
 
In short, Benedict XVI shares with Maritain a reliance on an important citation from 
St. Thomas.  Maritain uses the claim that the individual is not committed to political society 
according to everything she is.  Rather, Maritain claims, not only that the individual is 
anterior to society, but also that the summum bonum – the highest good – is an individual, not 
a communal, good.  His reliance on this claim opens the door for MacIntyre to criticize 
Maritain’s political society for failing to justify self-sacrifice or prioritize goods.  I shall 
argue that, even though Benedict XVI cites the same passage that undergirds Maritain’s 
individualism, he does not in fact fall to MacIntyre’s initial criticism of Maritain.  Benedict 
XVI conceives of the human person as a member of a family, not in terms of part to whole, 
but in terms of a whole belonging to a larger whole and seeking the common good. 
 
Centralizing the importance of the human family, in CIV Benedict XVI is able to call 
for a global political government with teeth.  We are challenged to become protagonists of 
globalization rather than its victims.  Once more, however, one should carefully consider the 
common good.  Even if Benedict XVI’s understanding of the human being is not 
individualist, he needs a more elegant understanding of politics as practice by which to 
accomplish his goals.  Recognizing the human being’s relational character, MacIntyre would 
encourage us to engage in local communities rather than relying on global government to 
satisfy human ends or bring us closer to the ultimate end of human life.  In fact, when 
families are engaged in healthy relationships with local communities they have a better 
chance of supporting and empowering individuals to become rational deliberators and, thus, 
protagonists of globalization.  Thus, while Benedict XVI rightly challenges us to become 
protagonists of globalization, his account requires a correction from MacIntyre to set up the 
real possibilities of that happening in the face of the present barbarism. 
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1: Benedict XVI and the Human Family 
  
 In chapter five of CIV, “The Cooperation of the Human Family,” Benedict XVI lays 
out his notion of the relational nature of the human being.  He situates his understanding of 
the human being within a discussion of the poverty that attends isolation.  “One of the 
deepest forms of poverty a person can experience is isolation”.1 Other forms of poverty, 
according to Benedict, arise out of isolation – “from not being loved or from difficulties in 
being able to love.”  Sin entered the world from a rejection of God’s love, which comes from 
“man’s basic and tragic tendency to close in on himself, thinking himself to be self-
sufficient.” 
   
Today, however, human beings are much more integrated than in the past.  “The 
explosion of worldwide interdependence,” or globalization, constitutes the new feature of the 
progress of humanity.  Cultures interact more easily than at any other time.2  Further, 
“humanity itself is becoming increasingly interconnected; it is made up of individuals and 
peoples to whom this process should offer benefits and development … the breaking down of 
borders is not simply a material fact; it is also a cultural event both in its causes and its 
effects”.3 
 
While social integration and globalization, especially on the economic level define 
our reality, Benedict XVI says we must transform this apparent integration “into true 
communion.” “The risk of our time is that the de facto interdependence of people and nations 
is not matched by ethical interactions of consciences and minds that would give rise to truly 
human development”.4  International trade limits the sovereignty of nations.5  Integral human 
development – the theme of CIV – requires “recognition that the human race is a single 
family”.6  Individuals must realize that human solidarity imposes duties on them.7  
Importantly, the economy, as a sector of human activity, “needs ethics in order to function 
correctly”.8  The common good, then, must include the whole human family.9 
 
 Under Benedict XVI’s vision of the human family lies a conception of the human 
person as relational.  Human beings are defined through interpersonal relations.  One matures 
authentically through living out these relations.  The human person establishes her worth, not 
through isolated activity, but through relating to others.  Benedict is quick to point out that 
Christian revelation prevents any too easy accommodation with totalitarian forms of society.  
The Christian community does not absorb the individual but values the individuals as 
someone in relation to community – that is, “a relation between one totality and another.”  
 
 Those familiar with Thomistic thought in the twentieth-century will hear echoes of the 
philosophy of Jacques Maritain.  Where Benedict writes of a relationship between one totality 
and another, Maritain writes of a relationship between wholes.  Moreover, in CIV Benedict 
XVI cites a passage that undergirds Maritain’s Thomistic liberalism, and one which proved 
subject of much debate.  Using Thomas Osborne’s analysis in “MacIntyre, Thomism, and the 
                                               
1
 Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 2009, n.55 
2
 CIV, n.26 
3
 Ibid., n.42 
4
 Ibid., n.9 
5
 Ibid., n.24 
6
 Ibid., n.53 
7
 Ibid., n.43 
8
 Ibid., n.45 
9
 Ibid., n.7 
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Contemporary Common Good,”10 I shall examine this debate briefly to show what results if 
one were to interpret Benedict XVI along the same lines as Maritain and then suggest that 
this is an incorrect interpretation of Benedict.  Rather, Benedict XVI calls us to recognize our 
human family and develop global government to address human needs.  I shall argue that 
MacIntyre’s recommendation of local communities provides a more fruitful path to becoming 
protagonists of globalization.  
  
2: Maritain, The Human Person, and the Common Good 
  
 Maritain distinguishes two aspects of the human being: the individual and the 
personal.  The human being is individual according to his/her material self.11  This claim 
follows from an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics.  According to an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
metaphysics, human beings are the kind of beings they are – i.e. human – because we share in 
the same form, human.  However, each human being is a separate, individual human being 
because we are distinguished by matter.  I consist, not simply of spirit, but of spirit-
informing-this-matter, and it’s my material reality that, at first, distinguishes me from you.12 
 
 According to Maritain, though, the human being is also “person” due to his/her 
spiritual reality.  Unlike material individuality that excludes us from others, person, or spirit, 
expresses itself to others.  Maritain defines the person as a term of “independence, as a reality 
which, subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe unto itself, a relatively independent 
whole”.13  The person, then is “a whole, an open and generous whole”.14  One might say, the 
human being is a totality. 
 
 Maritain, however, favors no state totalitarianism.  Using Thomistic metaphysics, he 
wants to strike a balance between anarchical individualism and state totalitarianism.  Though 
the person wants to be part of society, the person by no means is “in society in the way in 
which a part is in a whole and treated in society as a part in the whole”.15  Rather, Maritain 
distinguishes between a human being belonging to society according to his entire being and 
being fully committed to the whole of society.  “[A]lthough man in his entirety is engaged as 
a part of political society (since he may have to give his life for it), he is not a part of political 
society by reason of his entire self and all that is in him.  On the contrary, by reason of certain 
things in him, man in his entirety is elevated above political society”.16  Maritain cites a 
clause from the Summa Theologica I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad. 3, the same clause that Benedict XVI 
makes use of 63 years later in CIV.  “Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all 
that he is and has.”17 
 
                                               
10
 T. Osborne, ‘MacIntyre, Thomism, and the Common Good’, in Kelvin Knight and Paul Blackledge (eds.), 
Revolutionary Aristotelianism (Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius, 2008), pp. 75-90 
11
 J. Maritain, The Person and the Common Good trans. John J. Fitzgerald, (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2002), p.36 
12
 This metaphysical analysis leads St. Thomas into some interesting speculations about separate identity 
between the period of our death and the resurrection.  Confer, for instance, W. Norris Clarke, The One and the 
Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001) 
13
 Maritain, op. cit., p.40 
14
 Ibid., p.59 
15
 Ibid., p.58 
16
 Ibid., p.71 
17
 Benedict XVI cites the Latin: “Homo non ordinates ad communicate politicam secundum se totum et 
secundum omnia sua.” 
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 According to Thomas Osborne, “Maritain attempts to support a liberal democracy 
with an alternative account of the common good … by arguing that for Thomas Aquinas the 
individual has priority over the state”.18  Because human beings are person, Maritain 
concludes, according to Osborne, that “each human being has an individual good which is 
superior to that of any whole”.19  More importantly, one can interpret Maritain plausibly to 
hold that the individual person has priority over the common good.   
 
Osborne is right.  Maritain declares, for instance, that a society of free persons must 
be personalist  
 
because it considers society to be a whole composed of persons whose dignity 
is anterior to society and who, however indigent they may be, contain within 
their very being a root of independence and aspire to ever greater degrees of 
independence until they achieve that perfect spiritual liberty which no human 
society has within its gift.20   
 
Maritain argues, then, that, as a person, the human being stands above the political 
good even if, as a material political being, the human being is subservient to the common 
good.  The human person is engaged in his entirety in political society because said society 
may require him to sacrifice his life for it.  Yet, by her whole being, the person is elevated 
above political society.  For Osborne, the position that Maritain lays out falls to the same 
critique that Alasdair MacIntyre makes of the modern liberal society.  That criticism consists 
of two parts. 
 
First, the contemporary nation-state relies on the self-sacrifice of individuals in the 
roles of police officers, fire fighters, and soldiers.  Yet, the nation-state “presents itself as a 
kind of utility company,” providing material goods for its members.  Such a conception does 
not, according to MacIntyre, give the individual something to die for.21  Second, the 
contemporary nation-state must place value on “different kinds of practices and indeed on 
human life”.22  Osborne provides the example of safety regulations.  Such safety regulations 
include costs (value) that bureaucrats establish.  In setting such costs, however, the 
bureaucrats favor some practices over others. 
 
Maritain, as already noted, holds that the state can require the individual to sacrifice 
his life for the common good.  He goes further.  Because the individual human being depends 
on society to make up for his material deficiencies – for example, by teaching the 
mathematician mathematics – the state can require that the mathematician teach 
mathematics.23  On the other hand, the state cannot force the mathematician to teach or 
embrace mathematics that he does not hold as true.  Further, providing someone with 
education in mathematics, or other utility services, will not justify the state in requiring 
individuals to sacrifice their lives for the state.24 At this level, MacIntyre might grant that the 
individual under Maritain’s political philosophy would in fact teach mathematics. 
                                               
18
 Osborne, op. cit., p.72 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. Doris C. Anson. (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 
p.20 
21
 Osborne, op. cit., p.78 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, pp.73-4 
24
 Osborne, op. cit., p.84 
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The problem goes deeper, however.  A political community operating under 
Maritain’s political philosophy would not be able to prioritize practices.25  That is, it cannot 
justify requiring the mathematician to teach philosophy.  To do so would require it to affirm 
that the good of the individual is subordinate to the common good.  Consider, for instance, 
the case of someone who studies mathematics, not to teach, but to develop a closer 
relationship to God.  This mathematician may consider teaching to be antithetical to growing 
closer to God because that activity would require her to spend less time getting closer to God.  
Because Maritain conditions that the human person is not wholly part of the political state, he 
is open to this sort of criticism.  His prioritization of the individual over the state undermines 
the development of the virtues and undermines the pursuit of the human good.  The 
development of virtues and the pursuit of the human good require, on MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelian-Thomistic account, a society that can both justify itself to the point of death to 
the citizen and must prioritize or order practices according to the common good.26 
 
3: Benedict XVI, Maritain, and the Human Family 
 
When we consider the problems with Maritain’s political philosophy, we might 
question whether they are inherent to any Thomistic political philosophy or whether they 
result from a mis-interpretation of St. Thomas.  This question becomes all the more important 
for trying to grasp Benedict XVI’s political philosophy as laid out in CIV given his reliance 
on the same key passage from ST. I-II q. 21, a. 4, ad. 3.  Osborne draws on Charles De 
Koninck’s interpretation of this passage, in “In Defense of St. Thomas,”27 to argue that 
Thomas is not supporting individualism here.  “According to De Koninck, Thomas is saying 
that humans are only partially ordered to the political common good because the political 
common good is not the ultimate end of human beings”.28 
 
 Let’s consider the context of the citation from the Summa.  Question 21 concerns the 
merits and demerits of human action.  In article four, Thomas asks whether a human action is 
meritorious or demeritorious before God as regards good or evil.  Article four follows article 
three that asks whether an action is meritorious or not with respect to good and evil.  Thomas 
answers that an action receives merit or demerit with respect to justice.  Justice, however, 
concerns one’s relationship to others.  So actions are approved of or disapproved of on the 
basis of whether they help or hurt others.   
 
Article four follows from article three because one wants to know whether such 
actions in community also receive approbation or condemnation from God with respect to 
their good and evil.  Question 21, a. 4, ad 3, then, addresses, not simply the relationship of the 
individual to political community, i.e. justice, but the merits of an action in a political 
community with respect to God.  Thomas writes 
  
I answer that, a human action, as stated above [Article 3], acquires merit or 
demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, 
                                               
25
 Ibid., p.82 
26
 Ibid., p.78; cf: A MacIntyre, ‘Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good’, & MacIntyre, ‘Theories of 
Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity’, in Edward McLean (ed.), Common Truths: New 
Perspectives on Natural Law, (Wilmington, DC: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2000) pp. 91-115 
27
 C. De Koninck, ‘In Defense of St. Thomas; A Reply to Father Eschmann’s Attack on The Primacy of the 
Common Good’, in Ralph McInerny (ed.), The Writings of Charles De Koninck vol. II, pp. 205-365 
28
 Osborne, op. cit., p.77 
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or by reason of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and evil, 
acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part of God Himself, 
inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to 
the last end, as stated above.29 
 
 This answer rests on the claim in sentence two: “not all human actions are ordained to 
God.”  No human actions are ordained to something other than God – the body politics or 
other individuals or something else.  
 
The particular phrase that both Maritain and Benedict XVI cite come from article 
four, ad 3, where Thomas replies to an objection he entertains in setting up the question. The 
objection – that is, the actions do not have to be referred to God in order to be deemed 
meritorious or not – reads “Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being 
ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained to God. Therefore not every 
good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.”  Thomas thus replies:  
 
Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and 
so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in 
relation to the body politic.  Yet, all that man is, and can, and has, must be 
referred to God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, 
acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is 
concerned.  
 
For Thomas, the human being belongs in all that she “is and can and has” to God.  All 
human actions are judged according to that relationship and are, thus, meritorious or not 
according to that relationship.  Maritain interprets this passage to mean, as discussed above, 
that the human individual relates to God as final end as an individual final end.  De Koninck, 
however, holds that this means only that God is the common good of humanity – of all 
human beings.  Thomas does not support a conception of the individual over the common 
good.  Rather, he supports a view that humanity’s highest end – God – is a common good of 
humanity.  All actions, even those in the political state and in light of the common good, are 
judged, primarily, with respect to God as final end.30 
Does Benedict XVI, in citing the same section of the Summa, understand the 
individual’s relationship to the state the same way Maritain does?  Arguably not. 
 
Benedict XVI cites with the passage from the Summa a passage from Thomas’ 
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.  That passage properly translated reads, 
“the order of the part is opposed to the order of the whole.”31  This section of the 
Commentary concerns the relationship between the soul and human nature.  Thomas asserts 
that “the spirit is part of human nature.”  Thus, spirit is not a part opposed to the whole 
human being – something separate and distinct.  Rather, the spirit belongs to the whole of 
human nature.  Thus, for Thomas, “it is not possible to speak of the soul separate from the 
body” or the body separate from the soul.  We might say, using Benedict XVI’s words, that 
the soul is not isolated from the body or from the person. 
 
                                               
29
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, I-II, Q.19 Art.10 
30
 I want to thank Christopher Lutz for guidance in understanding this debate and the relevant passage from St. 
Thomas. 
31
 Thanks to Gerald Twaddell for research assistance in locating the Latin edition of this text and to Linda 
Showman for help in translating this passage. 
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Benedict, then, wants to motivate a metaphysics of the relations between human 
persons.  The “human community does not absorb the individual, annihilating his autonomy, 
as happens in various forms of totalitarianism, but rather values him all the more because of 
the relation between the individual and community is a relation between one totality and 
another”.32 
 
In short, Benedict XVI implies that human beings are related to each other as wholes 
in a family seeking God as the common good.  Throughout Caritas in Veritate, Benedict XVI 
speaks of the human family.33  He writes more, in fact, about the human family than he does 
about families per se.  The cooperation of the human family in the face of globalization 
proves to be of utmost importance for Benedict XVI.  He rightly fears that this understanding 
of family can be misinterpreted to support a totalitarian form of community or government.  
He is one with Maritain there.  Yet, Benedict XVI wants, not to prioritize the individual over 
the community, but to establish the relational nature of human beings in the face both of 
totalitarianism and rampant individualism.  Our common good is the good of the one human 
family.34 
 
This understanding of the human person as relational and of human beings 
constituting one global human family underlies Benedict XVI’s call for us to become 
protagonists of globalization.  “To take a stand for the common good is on the one hand to be 
solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of institutions that give 
structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically, and culturally, making it the 
polis, or ‘city.’”  This stand defines “the institutional path – we might also call it the political 
path” which will contribute “to the building of the universal City of God, which is the goal of 
the history of the human family”.35  Echoing John XXIII, Benedict XVI envisions this 
institutional path as giving rise to a global government. 
 
In the face of the unrelenting growth of global interdependence, there is a 
strongly felt need, even in the midst of global recession, for a reform of the 
United Nations Organization, and likewise the economic institutions and 
international finance, so that the concept of the family of nations can acquire 
real teeth.  One also senses the urgent need to find innovative ways of 
implementing the principle of responsibility to protect and of giving poorer 
nations an effective voice in shared decision-making … there is an urgent need 
of a true world political authority.36 
 
This authority must, of course, be regulated by law and seek the common good under 
the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity.  Moreover, it needs to be universally recognized 
as having authority and given effective power to achieve its goals and “ensure compliance 
with its decisions.” 
 
One can recognize the ideal which Benedict XVI lays down.  Obviously no nation-
state or religious body has the moral or political authority to lay down the law.  Nor does any, 
despite the delusions of the United States, have the real power to achieve its goals or ensure 
compliance.  While the ideal is pretty, if one follows MacIntyre’s criticism of modern nation-
                                               
32
 CIV, n.53 
33
 Ibid., n.7, 13, 33, 42, 53, 54, 57 
34
 Ibid., n.53 
35
 CIV, n.7 
36
 CIV, n.67 
7
Nicholas: Local Communities and Globalization in Caritas in Veritate
Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2011
  
states, Benedict XVI’s one world government comes up short.  We should, instead of turning 
to a global government, turn to local communities to support integral human development. 
 
4: MacIntyre’s Local Communities: An Attempt at Synthesis 
 
I do not want to be too quick here in asserting MacIntyre’s solution.  Osborne, whose 
critique of Maritain I followed, holds that a similar critique applies to MacIntyre.  For 
Osborne, when MacIntyre writes about local communities, he writes about “’workplaces, 
schools, parishes, trade union branches, adult education classes, and the like’”.37  For 
Osborne, because MacIntyre identifies local communities as workplaces, schools, parishes, 
etc., MacIntyre succumbs to the two criticisms he makes of nation-states.  “[N]one of these 
local communities is concerned with the good life as a whole … the local community’s 
weakness in ordering practices is similar to that of the contemporary nation-state”.38   
 
Further, according to Osborne, MacIntyre’s local communities cannot require the 
loyalty of a soldier or a police officer to the extent that it can justify the self-sacrifice of the 
soldier or police officer.  Thus, Osborne writes, “MacIntyre discusses several kinds of local 
communities, but none of them obviously should have coercive force”.39  Osborne continues  
 
MacIntyre does recognize that members of local communities will have to 
participate in conflicts between nation-states, but he does not indicate how this 
participation should occur.  Should an individual fishing crew decide to sign 
up in a war against totalitarian aggression?  Should such deliberation be 
assigned to a sports club or the members of a factory?40 
 
Given the examples Osborne uses, parishes and schools, on the one hand, and fishing 
crews and sports clubs, on the other, his argument against MacIntyre appears convincing.  If 
MacIntyre in fact identifies the local communities that he prizes as sports clubs and parishes, 
or work places and fishing crews, then he could not and should not expect such “local 
communities” either to be able to prioritize practices or to require the self-sacrifice of 
members for the good of the community. 
 
MacIntyre, however, does not identify local communities as fishing crews and 
parishes.  Rather, he identifies local communities as defined by shared deliberation that 
includes various institutions and associations.  If we examine the passage from which 
Osborne derives his list of MacIntyrean local communities, we see that MacIntyre has been 
misread. 
 
If then the nation-state cannot provide a form of association directed towards 
the relevant type of common good, what of the family?  Families at their best 
are forms of association in which children are first nurtured, and then educated 
for and initiated into the activities of the adult world in which their parent’s 
participatory activities provide them both with resources and models.  It 
follows that the quality of life of a family is in key part a function of the 
quality of relationships of the individual members of the family to and in a 
variety of other institutions and associations: workplaces, schools, parishes, 
                                               
37
 Osborne, op. cit., p.78 & 84 
38
 Ibid., p.84 
39
 Ibid., p.86 
40
 Ibid., p.86-7 
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sports clubs, trade union branches, adult education classes, and the like.  And 
it is insofar as children learn to recognize and to pursue as their own, and 
parents and other adult members of the family continue to recognize and 
pursue, the goods internal to the practices of which such associations and 
institutions are the milieu that the goods of the family are realized.  The family 
flourishes only if its social environment also flourishes.41 
 
In this passage, MacIntyre identifies the family as one association.  He further 
recognizes that the health of the family depends, in part, on the health of the relationship of 
the members of the family to other institutions and associations.  When he writes about the 
“goods internal to the practices of such associations and institutions,” the associations and 
institutions refer to the parishes and trade unions.  Nowhere does he refer to schools and 
parishes as local communities.  Rather, the local community is identified as the social 
environment of the family – that is, all of those associations and institutions together with the 
family.  Thus, MacIntyre is able to write “[I]t must instead be some form of local community 
within which the activities of families, workplaces, schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate 
and clubs dedicated to games and sports, and religious congregations may all find a place”.42 
The local community, rather than being defined as, rather encompasses families, workplaces, 
trade unions, parishes, etc. 
 
If my interpretation of MacIntyre’s local communities proves correct, then Osborne’s 
criticism of MacIntyre rests on a mistake.  The question consists, not in whether parishes and 
schools can require self-sacrifice and prioritize goods, but whether local communities that 
include parishes and schools can require self-sacrifice and prioritize goods.  
If we follow MacIntyre, we should establish, support, and engage in local 
communities.  Societies that allow individual to flourish possess three characteristics.43  First, 
the members of the society recognize that obedience to the precepts of natural law is 
necessary if they are to discover their individual and common good.  Second, they will be 
small scale and self-sufficient, “to protect themselves from the destructive incursions of the 
state and the wider market economy”.44  They will be societies of small producers rather than 
large scale, mis-named, free markets.  MacIntyre is quick to point out that such small scale 
communities will not be compartmentalized and will not recognize their activities as 
compartmentalized from the political unit.  Such compartmentalization, or fragmentation, 
rather, characterizes the politics of late modernity.  Further, especially in the political realm, 
individuals will present themselves honestly in their whole aspect rather than as fictional 
characters running for office. 
 
This conclusion entails that Catholic social teaching should turn away from 
discussions of global justice and a call for a global government with teeth and turn to 
discussions of how parishes, monasteries, and other religious communities can participate in, 
support, and belong to local communities of the kind MacIntyre prefers.  Here I think we can 
tie together some of Benedict XVI’s words with MacIntyre’s own thought. 
 
In §66, Benedict XVI calls on consumers to become more educated about their daily 
role in purchasing.  Such education can be accomplished, not only through schools, but also 
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through the parish as a dialogue partner in the common good of the local community.  
Further, consumers should search for new ways for exploring their economic roles.  Benedict 
XVI mentions consumer cooperatives.  Despite the fact that he makes these claims in a 
section focused on the global market, education and developing new modes of economic 
living are always local activities.  They bring into question how the local community can 
supply its basic needs and provide a milieu for social flourishing.   
 
Genuinely free markets are always local and small-scale in whose exchanges 
producers can choose to participate or not.  And societies with genuinely free 
markets will be societies of small producers … in which no one is denied the 
possibility of the kind of productive work without which they cannot take their 
place in those relationships through which the common good is realized.45   
 
One way of supporting local communities and their economies consists in developing 
local forms of control over utilities.  A community that builds solar panels or wind turbines to 
provide electricity for itself moves one step closer to being self-sufficient.  A church that aids 
in this self-sufficiency increases the local autonomy, not only of the community, but of itself 
and, further, protects the environment, an important concern of Benedict XVI’s.   
 
Also of import in relation to MacIntyre is Benedict XVI’s call, following the tradition 
of Catholic Social Teaching from the publication of Rerum Novarum in 1891 on, to support 
trade unions.46  However, he calls for such unions to turn away from their nationalistic 
interests to global interests.  At this point, some ground must be bridged between Benedict 
XVI and MacIntyre.  Labor unions will always be concerned with local institutions.  Yet, 
they will gain more power to achieve their defense of the worker by aligning with workers in 
other communities and, thus, across the globe.  When the focus becomes one of power or of 
money, however, it will always be the local community that will call the trade union back to 
its basic good.  Here, we should see local parishes and religious communities, not only 
supporting, but requiring their non-ordained employees to join unions.   
 
Talk of local communities is all well and good, someone might say, but what of 
globalization?  Benedict XVI calls for us to become protagonists of globalization rather than 
its victims.47  I think MacIntyre can make the most significant correction to Caritas in 
Veritate on this point. 
 
Lying at the center of MacIntyre’s embrace of local communities and his rejection of 
nation-states and globalization is rational debate and deliberation.  Rational debate and 
deliberation remain absent from nation-states, despite the fact of voting, and nothing suggests 
anything will be different on the global level.  The “vast majority have no say as to the 
alternatives between which they are permitted to choose.  And there is no way in which the 
elites that determine those alternatives can be effectively challenged or called to account”.48  
Moreover, contemporary “education systematically prepares children to inhabit and to accept 
a society of gross inequalities and fails to prepare them for rational deliberation.”  Both a 
system that allows rational deliberation and the individuals ability to call political leaders to 
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question and a system that educates people for rational deliberation prove necessary for 
human flourishing at the level of the political common good.  Lack of these aspects in 
modern nation states obscures “from most people in advanced societies the salient fact … that 
the costs of globalizing change, like the costs of natural disorders and the costs of war, are 
inflicted on and paid by those least able to afford them.” 
 
If we are to become protagonists of globalization, we will have to be able to engage in 
shared rational deliberation and call to account those who presume to be our leaders.  
MacIntyre and Benedict XVI are on the same line here, but MacIntyre recognizes the features 
of late advanced capitalism that prevent the hopes of Benedict XVI to come to fruition.  
Which fact leads to one more way in which Catholic Social Teaching must proceed: as 
members of local communities, churches must be at the forefront of educating children and 
adults.  Bishops who look too easily to filling the pulpit at the cost of educating their 
ministers fail, not only the global Church and human society, but the local communities, and 
in so failing their local communities exacerbate their failure of humanity.  Education within 
the Church, in its seminaries and universities, must embrace the challenge of education that 
MacIntyre makes in his recent God, Philosophy, and Universities.49 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have examined Benedict XVI’s metaphysics of the human person as relational in 
Caritas in Veritate in light of Alasdair MacIntyre’s political philosophy.  Benedict XVI cites 
a section of the Summa which proved controversial under Maritain’s interpretation.  
Following Osborne’s discussion, I argued that Maritain misinterpreted the passage in 
question and, further, that, combined with a passage from the Commentary on the Sentences, 
Benedict XVI avoids Maritain’s interpretational mistake.  Rather prioritizing the individual 
over the common good, Benedict XVI emphasizes that all human beings belong to the human 
family.  We must, as a family, become protagonists of globalization by instituting a global 
government with real teeth.  I suggested, further, that this call undermines itself insofar as it 
presents politics as an institution rather than a practice.  Politics as practice is local and 
undergirds rational deliberation which is necessary for achieving the human end.   
 
From this conclusion, I’ve argued that we need to look more closely at MacIntyre’s 
alternative to the modern nation-state: local communities. This move entailed examining 
what MacIntyre means by local communities.  Rejecting Osborne’s interpretation that local 
communities can be identified with parishes, schools, and trade unions, I noted that 
MacIntyre says such communities have three characteristics.  They are (1) observant of 
natural law, (2) small scale, and (3) societies of small producers.  The first condition aligns 
MacIntyre’s local communities with the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching by recognizing 
the importance of natural law as a foundation for a just society in which its members flourish.  
Thus, one avenue of further discussion would concern the development of a truly Thomistic 
natural law.  MacIntyre has provided some possible way signs on this account, but a greater 
development (such as the one I offered in 2009 at the Third Annual Conference of the 
International Society of MacIntyrean Enquiry)50 needs to continue.   
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Further, the local church, in part headed by her bishop or abbot, must become an 
active participant in local communities helping them establish local economies, local power 
sources, and trade unions that have global reach.  Most importantly, however, the local 
church must support with the community, including under the auspices of its national 
education system, a reformed education that sets the child up, not for living within a 
globalized oligarchy in which leaders are selected by some elite, but for true rational 
deliberation.  The tasks of philosophy, then, become both theoretical, in developing accounts 
of natural law, deliberative democracy, and rational deliberation, and practical, in actively 
supporting concrete practices, institutions, and associations in the pursuit of the common 
good at the local political level.  Only by incorporating that pursuit of the political common 
good in our lives can human beings, as individuals and in communion, achieve the ultimate 
good that stands at the end of all time and reality.51 
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